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As of January 26, 2021, Iran has reported a total of 57,481 death and more than
1,300,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19, making it the hardest-hit country in the
Middle East. After days of denial, Iranian officials finally confirmed the first COVID-19
related death on February 19, 2020. The government’s response in the early days
of the pandemic was a preview of what was to come: refusing to quarantine the
city of Qom, the first epicenter of COVID in Iran; rejecting the call to postpone the
Parliamentary elections; and continuing to receive flights from China, all resulting in
the quick spread of the virus across the country.
Iran has only recently come out of its third, and so far, the deadliest wave of COVID
and is still embracing the possibility of a fourth wave in the winter. In almost a
year since the outbreak, the Iranian government’s response can generally be
characterized as reactive, lagging, and ineffective. Unlike other countries that have
witnessed anti-lockdown protests, the Iranian government has widely been criticized
for its lack of/ or insufficient action. With each peak, healthcare professionals and the
public have repeatedly urged the government to shut down the country temporarily.
But the government has only reluctantly imposed some relatively loose restrictions,
which have been even less effective in execution. The government’s reluctance to
enforce lockdowns has partly been attributed to the country’s economic downfall in
the wake of the U.S.-imposed sanctions and its inability to provide for the people.
Yet, the domestic mismanagement of the crisis is also undeniable.
In this post, I examine the institutional response to the COVID-19 crisis and trace
the origins of the new institutional set-up within the current constitutional framework
and the ways in which this model has created new challenges for the future of
constitutionalism in Iran. In particular, I argue that the institutional design of the
COVID response has once again exposed the structural defects and limits of Iran’s
constitutional system, especially with respect to the division of power between
the government and the Supreme Leader. Moreover, and in line with the broader
direction in recent years, this crisis has further contributed to the parliament’s
marginalization.
The Creation of the National Headquarter to Combat
Corona (NHCC)
Immediately after the public confirmation of the first cases of Covid in Iran, the
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) took the matters into its own hand.
Behind closed doors, it issued an order to set up the National Headquarter to
Combat Corona (NHCC). It also announced that the NHCC’s orders enjoy the same
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degree of authority as the SNSC. The SNSC’s role as the main organ to assume
the power was constitutionally consequential. It signaled the fact that the issue was
quickly designated as a national security threat. This is particularly significant as
some officials, including the Supreme Leader himself, tiptoed around the idea of
bioterrorism in the early days of the pandemic. The SNSC consists of the heads
of the three branches of the government, Chief of the Supreme Command Council
of the Armed Forces, the officer in charge of the planning and budget affairs, two
representatives nominated by the Leader, ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and
Intelligence, a minister related with the subject, and the highest-ranking officials from
the Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps. Although SNSC is
presided by the president, the Constitution explicitly states that its decisions shall
only be effective upon the Supreme Leader’s approval.
Article 79 of the Constitution does give the government the power to temporarily
impose certain necessary restrictions in case of war or other emergencies. But
such invocation is conditioned upon approval of the parliament and needs to be
reauthorized every thirty days. The SNSC path chosen to confront the COVID crisis
transferred the power from the two elected branches to a more restricted group with
the ultimate approval power given to the Supreme Leader. This last feature became
a double-edged sword in the fight against the COVID.
Under Iran’s Constitution, the Supreme Leader enjoys a significant share of the
executive power. He is the Commander in Chief, sets the general policies of
the state, and holds significant appointment powers. On March 12, 2020, the
Supreme Leader ordered the Supreme Command Council of Armed Forces to set
up temporary hospitals and take necessary measures to treat the patients and
prevent the further spread of the virus in the country. He instructed the military to
cooperate with the government and the Ministry of Health and Medical Education.
He also lent his full support to establishing the NHCC and stated that following the
NHCC’s orders is a legal and religious obligation. This support was critical in the
NHCC’s decision to close Holy Shrines in Qom and Mashhad and suspend Friday
congregations in almost all cities across the country. It is clear that had it not been
for his support, the NHCC would have failed to enforce these religiously sensitive
decisions in the face of fierce opposition and resistance within more conservative
segments of the population and political forces. As one of the MPs said, surprisingly,
“who could have imagined that one day the Minister of Health would be able to order
the closure of mosques and Friday prayers? Who could have imagined that the
military would follow the orders of the Minister of Health?”
Although the Supreme Leader’s support reinforced the NHCC’s authority, at the
same time, it exposed the limits and fragility of this relationship. This imbalance
of power meant that the Supreme Leader’s clear opposition or even his silence
could trouble the enforcement of the NHCC’s decisions in the future. The recent
controversy over vaccination manifested NHCC’s tenuous situation. In his recent
speech, the Supreme Leader unequivocally announced a ban on importing the
U.S. and U.K. vaccines. Many healthcare professionals, including those within the
Scientific Committee of the NHCC, and even more tacitly the president, expressed
their discontent with this decision. Yet, in the wake of his speech, some pre-orders
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were supposedly canceled, and NHCC’s attention shifted to Russian, Chinese,
and Cuban vaccines instead. The result has been public outrage and one of the
nation’s top infectious disease specialists publicly announcing that she would not
get a Russian vaccine. The same is true with regard to some major religious events
such as Muharram, which ordinarily gathers hundreds of thousands of mourners
each year. Although the Supreme Leader clearly stated that he defers to the decision
of the NHCC, he made it clear that those who appreciate the value of the prayer
shall make the call. In the end, the NHCC issued a set of guidelines and urged the
religious centers to scale back their events and comply with the Ministry of Health’s
protocols. However, in practice, the lack of total shutdown and poor execution of
protocols brought about some mass gatherings.
The Expansion of the NHCC’s Power and Its
Dubious Legal Grounds
In its order to establish the NHCC, the SNSC indicated that NHCC’s decisions
carry the same weight as those of the SNSC. The SNSC’s decisions are not
usually public, and there are scholarly debates as to the place of its decisions
in the legal hierarchy. Its enactments certainly do not qualify as legislation, and
therefore, are not subject to constitutional review by the Guardian Council, the
organ of judicial review in Iran. On the other hand, the legal practice in the past
few decades suggests that the SNSC’s decisions cannot merely be classified as
executive or administrative decisions. In fact, Article 12 of the Law on Organization
and Procedure of the Court of Administrative Justice (as amended in 2013) clearly
states that SNSC’s decisions are outside the purview of the Court. More critically, it
is suggested that even the parliament lacks the power to override or modify SNSC’s
decisions.
It is against this backdrop that the legal authority of the NHCC’s decisions and
available remedies for potential violation of individual rights and freedoms becomes
significant. In fact, the Interior Minister went as far as saying that NHCC’s decisions
are more authoritative than a law. The centralization of power in the NHCC did not
result in swift and aggressive measures to combat the pandemic, though. It was only
in November 2020, in the face of the deadliest wave of the COVID, that the NHCC
adopted the Comprehensive Plan for Covid-19 Restrictions, which created a targeted
and smart response system to the spread of the virus across the country. NHCC’s
main body, which makes the final decisions, mostly consists of cabinet members
(president, ministers of Interior, Health, Transportation, Education, etc.), a member
from the Budget and Planning Organization, a member from the Guardian Council,
and the armed forces. The NHCC does have sub-committees with epidemiologists
and experts in it, but the political appointees have the upper hand in the decision-
making process. This set-up has, sometimes, led to contradictory voices coming out
of the NHCC with public health experts challenging the adequacy of the NHCC’s
decisions.
The inefficacy of the NHCC and its refusal to order complete shutdowns when
necessary is just one side of the story. As time has passed, the NHCC has adopted
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more aggressive measures in some areas, such as COVID-related data collection.
In October, the NHCC required all medical centers to transfer information about
those diagnosed with COVID-19 to the Ministry of Health’s central database. It also
required individuals infected to self-report to the Ministry of Health, download the
authorized tracking application, and not break the quarantine. In November, the
NHCC passed a resolution requiring government offices to scan smart national ID
cards before rendering their services. In the same session, the NHCC authorized
the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Minister to track data of
those diagnosed and notify the Ministry of Health if they break the quarantine.
In December, the Ministry of Health announced that hotels, travel agencies,
organizations, and even malls could designate a contact person to connect to the
centralized database of Covid patients. They also offered to share the data with the
ride-sharing applications. It is not clear to what extent these measures have been
operationalized yet. Nevertheless, it has been reported that the records have already
been used to prevent 700 individuals from getting on flights. A report released by
the ICT Ministry catalogs the data collection measures employed in countries like
China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, indicating that the NHCC may move
more aggressively to follow their direction. Copying the South Korean model, the ICT
Ministry, in its report, suggested using the Central Bank’s financial transaction data
in contact tracing.
These developments bring to the forefront the questions about the limits of the
NHCC or any other SNSC-authorized institution in the law-making and the remedial
measures available for potential violations of individual rights and freedoms. The
prospect does not look very promising. As discussed earlier, to treat SNSC’s
decisions and those of its sub-institutions as a separate category that is not subject
to judicial review or legislative override can potentially pose serious problems if not
this time around, certainly in the future.
The Marginalization of Parliament
Absent from the discussions so far is the parliament. The political and constitutional
developments during the Covid crisis once again confirmed this understanding that
the parliament has mostly been sidelined within the Iranian legal system. Although
crisis management requires swift actions that are characteristics of the executive,
invoking emergency powers could have given some supervisory power to the
parliament. Moreover, there seems to be no legislator in the composition of the
NHCC’s main body even though a representative of the Guardian Council and armed
forces are present. This does not mean that the parliament is kept in the dark. There
seem to be some meetings between the parliament’s commissions and relevant
cabinet members, but no major legislation has passed in this regard.
On April 7, 2020, as the cases were rapidly increasing, a few MPs unhappy with the
government’s failure to declare a lockdown introduced a bill to shut down the country
for a month. The proposal was soon rejected by the deputy spokesperson, who said
the bill violated Article 79 of the Constitution on emergency powers because it is the
executive that needs to initiate the emergency power declaration, not the parliament.
Aside from modifications in the Budget Law, the only other legislative measure was
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a bill proposed in November 2020 that required the government to provide essential
goods in case of lockdown and compensate struggling businesses. It also included
a provision extending the lease contracts up to three months after the end of the
pandemic with a maximum 20% increase in the rents. The bill is not yet passed in
the parliament. However, the NHCC has periodically ordered the extension of lease
contracts on its own. In November, the parliament passed a law on Requiring the
Government to Pay Subsidies for Essential Goods. As a result of the U.S.’s crippling
sanctions, the cash handouts are not new in Iran. The Law does not explicitly name
COVID but is clearly passed with the pandemic’s economic impact in mind and
provides a very modest payment (less than $6 per individual and half of that for
those with fixed income) to a total of 60 million Iranians for six months. Instead of
enforcing the Law, and in the face of the MPs’ objections, the NHCC modified the
terms and eventually passed a resolution to pay roughly $ 4 per individual to 40
million people for four months.
Passing the Budget Law also turned to a legislative crisis last March, as the NHCC
almost forced the parliament to cancel its sessions due to the outbreak. With time
running out to pass the budget, the parliament’s spokesperson wrote a letter to the
Supreme Leader asking for his authorization to pass the law in the Joint Commission
instead of the parliament’s plenary session as they were unable to reconvene. At the
time, the Supreme Leader authorized this move, and the parliament subsequently
revised its Rules of Procedure to allow for the use of video conferencing. However,
the idea of an ad hoc institution created by the SNSC forcing the parliament’s
closure sets off alarm bells.
Conclusion
In general, the COVID-19 outbreak has created a playbook for handling future crises,
public health, or otherwise. The institutional set-up to combat the pandemic has
exposed the shortcomings and a need for an effective and transparent response
system. It has highlighted the potentials for further power grabs and raised new
questions with regard to the power of the SNSC and its sub-institutions. The
Expediency Council, which is in charge of setting the state’s general policies,
has already issued an order to use the COVID-19 experience to reform the
state’s general policies in public health and national security area with a focus on
bioterrorism. What direction these reforms will take remains to be seen.
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